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WHEN IS A QUOTE NOT A QUOTE?: THE
SUBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH IN MASSON V.
NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.
In the 1964 landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan,1 the United States Supreme Court rendered the first of a
series of decisions which ultimately dismantled much of the com-
mon law of defamation.2 By requiring that the protection of an in-
' 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times concerned a suit brought by one of three
elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama over an allegedly libelous full-
page advertisement published in the New York Times. Id. at 256. Although the p'aintiff was
not mentioned by name in the ad, testimony was offered at trial tending to prove that,
based on his position and responsibilities within the city government, plaintiff could have
been, and was, understood to have been responsible for the acts described in the ad. Id. at
258.
In reversing a $500,000 jury award for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment guarantees of free press and free speech require a rule which "prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
279-80.
1 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS §111 (5th ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. "Defamation is made up of
the twin torts of libel and slander-the one being, in general, written [libel] while the other
in general is oral [slander] .... In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in
reputation and good name." Id. at 771.
The English common law of defamation traces its roots from the seignorial courts of the
early Middle Ages, through the ecclesiastical courts of the long epoch of unchallenged
Church authority, to the Kings' courts and the Court of Star Chamber-which began to
punish the crime of political libel-and eventually on to the common law courts. See Eaton,
The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1975). One commentator notes that the "com-
mon law of defamation slowly grew into a forest of complexities, overgrown with anomalies,
inconsistencies, and perverse rigidities. It became thicketed with brambled traps for inno-
cent defendants, crisscrossed with circuitous paths and dead ends for seriously wronged
plaintiffs, and enshrouded in a 'fog of fictions, inferences, and presumptions.'" Id. (quoting
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 740, 98 P. 281, 291 (1908)).
Another commentator has described the common law of defamation as:
[A] mass which has grown by aggregation, with very little intervention from
legislation, and special and peculiar circumstances have from time to time
shaped its varying course. The result is that perhaps no other branch of the
law is as open to criticism for its doubts and difficulties, its meaningless and
grotesque anomalies. It is, as a whole, absurd in theory, and very often mis-
chievous in its practical operation.
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLuMt. L. REv. 546, 546
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dividual's reputation be weighed against the strong fundamental
values which shield the American press,3 New York Times and its
progeny4 have injected a first amendment analysis into the law of
defamation.5 As a result, the fulcrum upon which defamation
claims brought by "public figures"'6 now rest is the plaintiff's abil-
ity to prove "actual malice."7 Actual malice is defined as the publi-
(1903).
As a result of the evolution of the common law of defamation "there is a great deal of
the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for
which no legal writer ever has had a kind word." PROSSER & KEETON, supra, at 771.
However, the "New York Times line of cases ... has filled a void and added a constitu-
tional norm to the list of situations in which one person may accuse another of wrongdoing."
Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEx. L. REv. 303, 330 (1987). Yet, "[w]hether the
competing social interests represented by the law of defamation and the first amendment
have been appropriately compromised by the Court's forays is a question that will engage
courts and commentators for years." Eaton, supra, at 1351.
1 See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199, 200 (1976). "[A]ll of the New York Times series of deci-
sions, attempt[] to reconcile mutually irreconcilable values: the polity's interest in free and
full interchange of potentially useful information and ideas, and the citizen's interest in
freedom from destructive invasions of his reputation, relationships, and personality." Id; see
also Rosenberg, Taking a Look at "The Distorted Shape of an Ugly Tree". Efforts at Pol-
icy-Surgery on the Law of Libel During the Decade of the 1940s, 15 N. Ky. L. REv. 11, 55
(1988) (New York Times "adopted a legal rule that attempted to weigh competing interests
and strike a 'balance' between reputation and free speech"); cf. Franklin & Bussel, The
Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 835
n.33 (1984) ("The sum of these cases, then, is that New York Times is not simply about the
protection of the democratic process but about the protection of speech per se").
' See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (public plaintiff
required to show actual malice for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New
York Times); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59, 763
(1985) (when private plaintiff sues on statement not of public concern, recovery of presumed
and punitive damages without showing actual malice will be allowed); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-47 (1974) (no constitutional requirement for showing actual
malice where plaintiff is neither public official nor public figure).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id. Although the
first amendment specifically restricts only Congress, it has been held to apply to all
branches of the federal government, and, through the fourteenth amendment, it has been
further extended to all branches of state governments as well, including state courts. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
6 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978). Trying to define what exactly makes a person a "public figure" has been
described as "trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." Id. at 443. Although the term does not
lend itself to easy definition, it does appear clear that the nature of a particular individual's
position or status, not his mere rank or title, will be determinative. See New York Times,
376 U.S. at 279; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1959).
See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279; accord Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284
(1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270 (1970).
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cation of defamatory material with knowledge of its falsity or a
reckless disregard for its truth." The application and development
of this standard has resulted, by design,9 in the protection of the
In the years following New York Times, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
which "clarified and expanded the new constitutional privilege" it had granted to the press.
Robertson, supra note 3, at 202. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the
Court sought a proper accommodation between the law of defamation and freedom of the
press, and, noting that "compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals re-
quires... a different rule" than compensating injury to a public official or a public person,
held the actual malice standard inapplicable to the former. Id. at 343.
One commentator summarized the stratification of the law after Gertz as follows:
(1) "Public officials" and "public figures" may recover for defamation only on a
[showing of] New York Times malice ....
(2) Respecting private plaintiffs, the state may define the appropriate standard of
liability "so long as they do not impose liability without fault." Caveat: This
standard applies at least where "the substance of the defamatory statement
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent."
(3) No plaintiff may recover presumed or punitive damages, "at least when liabil-
ity is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth." For defamation plaintiffs who do not prove [either of these], recov-
ery is to be limited to "compensation for actual injury."
Robertson, supra note 3, at 213-14 (footnotes omitted).
8 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Supreme Court clarified the application of
the recklessness strand of this standard in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31
(1968). The St. Amant Court noted that "'[reckless disregard' . . . cannot be fully encom-
passed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked . . . case-by-
case." Id. at 730. The Court then concluded that "reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before
publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. The Court
further stated that a publisher "cannot... automatically insure a favorable verdict by testi-
fying that he published with a belief that the statements were true." Id. at 732; see also
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (circumstantial evidence, such
as defendant's conduct, may be used to prove actual malice).
It has been suggested that the "actual malice" standard is too imprecise and confusing
to be of value as a benchmark denoting a constitutional immunity, especially in the context
of a jury trial. See Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). In Westmoreland, Judge Leval expressed concern over the possi-
bility of prejudice, to either party, should a jury confuse the New York Times definition of
malice with the more prevalent common law understanding of the term, i.e., spite or ill will.
Id. He therefore substituted the term "constitutional malice" for "actual malice." Id. Judge
Leval explained that, although a reporter should not be held liable "for accusations that are
responsibly researched and sincerely believed, no matter the extent of his ill will towards
[his] subject," a jury might still find "an unwarranted liability" if they are "repeatedly told
... evidence is being received on the issue of 'malice.'" Id. Similarly, he explained, a
"plaintiff's burden of proving a reporter's recklessness to the jury will unfairly increase if
the element is disguised under the label 'malice.'" Id.
See Ocala Star-Banner, 401 U.S. at 301 (White, J., concurring). Justice White
pointed out that "imposing on libel and slander plaintiffs the burden of showing knowing or
reckless falsehood in specified situations will result in extending constitutional protection to
lies and falsehoods which, though neither knowing nor reckless, do severe damage to per-
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press from liability for publications short of the most blatant and
intentional falsehoods.10 Recently, in Masson v. New Yorker Mag-
azine, Inc.," the Ninth Circuit held that actual malice could not
be inferred from the attribution to a public figure of fabricated
quotations which either rationally interpreted ambiguous remarks
or faithfully conveyed the substantive content of unambiguous
remarks.12
In Masson, plaintiff Jeffrey M. Masson. sued author Janet
Malcolm and her publishers, New Yorker Magazine and Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., for the allegedly libelous publication of a two-part
magazine article, as well as a book based on that article (collec-
tively, the "article"). 3 The article concerned Masson's firing as
projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives.' 4 Malcolm based
the article on a series of conversations she had with Masson, all of
which were tape-recorded. 5 However, Malcolm did not limit her-
self to words taken directly from those conversations; rather, she
altered, edited and added to Masson's words, while attributing
them to Masson as direct quotes.' 6 She claimed that this was in-
sonal reputation." Id. (White, J., concurring). Thus, to protect the truth from being sup-
pressed, "innocent falsehoods are sometimes protected [even though it will achieve] nothing
but gratuitous injury." Id. (White, J., concurring).
10 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1966) (intent to injure or evil motive
will not alone support inference of actual malice); New York Times, Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d
567, 575 (5th Cir. 1966) (failure to retract defamatory statement not indicative of actual
malice); Rosanova, 411 F. Supp. at 447-48 (where reliable source utilized, failure to check
police records reckless); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 526, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 831 (2d
Dep't 1964) (negligence in failing to discover misstatement of fact insufficient for inference
of actual malice), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
11 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
12 Id. at 1455-56. The court also held that actual malice could not be inferred from
misleadingly edited quotations, provided such editing amounts to one of a number of ra-
tional" interpretations of an ambiguous statement. Id. at 1461-63.
13 Id. at 1453.
14 Id. The article "described the struggle between Masson and other board members
...over Sigmund Freud's abandonment of the 'seduction theory'--a hypothesis that as-
sumes that certain mental illnesses originate in sexual abuse during childhood." Id. Masson
claimed he was fired "because he 'went public' with his views that Freud abandoned the
seduction theory simply to further his career and placate his colleagues." Id.
1 Id. "According to Masson, Malcolm asked him whether she could tape-record the
interviews and 'explained that this would be to [Masson's] advantage, since it would mean
there would be no misquotations.'" Id. at 1483 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 1456-63. Masson cited nine instances in the article where Malcolm altered or
fabricated quotations. Id. These included Masson referring to himself as an "intellectual
gigolo," id. at 1456-58, as well as "the greatest analyst who ever lived," id. at 1459, and
referring to Freud as a moral coward. Id. at 1458. Malcolm also quoted Masson as claiming
he would turn Anna Freud's house into "a place of sex, women, [and] fun." Id. In addition,
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tended to paint a picture which was, as she termed, "as lifelike and
real as possible.' 1 7 Masson sued, contending that Malcolm made
him appear" 'unscholarly, irresponsible, vain [and] lacking [in per-
sonal] honesty and moral integrity.' ,,18 The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that ac-
tual malice was lacking.19 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.20
Writing for the court, Judge Alarcon first determined that the
issue presented was novel both within the circuit and in the Su-
preme Court.21 The court then examined several federal and state
Masson also noted an instance where Malcolm misleadingly edited a quote by eliminating 33
of 45 words in a sentence without substituting ellipses, resulting in Masson appearing to
have stated that he was the wrong man to look to to do the honorable thing. Id. at 1462-63.
The words Malcolm deleted tended to characterize Masson as the wrong man to choose to
sit idly by so as to avoid negative personal and professional repercussions. Id.
In his dissent, Judge Kozinski noted that "at least one piece of direct evidence [estab-
lished] that Malcolm engaged in deliberate fabrication." Id. at 1483 (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Kozinski pointed to a typed draft of the article which contained an alteration of
a quote crossed out and replaced by another alteration which departed even further from
the substance of Masson's actual statement. Id. According to Judge Kozinski, from this evi-
dence "the jury could easily infer that Malcolm made the change in a deliberate effort to
distort what Masson said or with reckless disregard to whether it accurately reflected Mas-
son's words." Id. See generally infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (doctoring quota-
tions may constitute actual malice and thus offend first amendment).
" Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989). Malcolm contended in an affidavit that she "quoted Mr.
Masson accurately . . . [and] presented him as he presented himself," and that she "in-
vented nothing." Id.
" Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453. Masson claimed that the defendants violated California
Civil Code § 45 by libeling him and placing him in a false light. Id. Under the California
statute, "[1]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing [or] printing ... which
exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." Id. at 1481
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 45 (West 1982)).
The damaging effect of Malcolm's article was evidenced by some disparaging pieces
subsequently written about Masson, which were based on the article and, more specifically,
the quotes it contained. Id. at 1465 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). For instance, one review of
Malcolm's article in the Boston Globe found that Masson "'emerges gradually, as a grandi-
ose egotist-mean-spirited, self-serving, full of braggadocio, impossibly arrogant and, in the
end, a self-destructive fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words
reveal this psychological profile . . . through the efforts of an observer and listener.'" Id.
(quoting Coles, Freudianism and its Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, at 58) (em-
phasis added by court).
"8 Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1407. The trial court found that "[n]o clear and convincing
evidence exists that would justify a finding that ... [the defendants] entertained serious
doubts about the truth of the disputed passages." Id.
20 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1464.
"1 Id. at 1454. The court phrased the issue as "whether a finding of malice may hinge
upon evidence showing that a defamatory statement attributed to a person by using quota-
tion marks does not contain his or her exact words." Id.
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appellate decisions,22 and concluded that as long as the writer did
not publish fictionalized quotes which were "wholly the product"
of imagination,23 i.e., quotes which altered the substantive content
of unambiguous remarks,24 and as long as the edited quotes were
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous remarks, 25 no reasonable
jury could conclude26 that the writer published the quotes with ac-
tual malice. Applying these standards to the instant case, the
court concluded that Malcolm quoted Masson with sufficient accu-
racy to require the dismissal of Masson's claims.2s
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that "[t]he press
can legitimately claim the right to editorial judgment when it is
selecting words itself [but] it cannot, and does not, claim the right
to select words for others. '29 The dissent further maintained that
the determination of the instant case should rest on the idea that
"what somebody says is a fact, and that doctoring a quotation is no
more protected by the first amendment than is any other falsifica-
tion."30 Employing this proposition, Judge Kozinski applied a five-
step test3' from which he concluded that a reasonable jury could in
22 Id. at 1454-56.
"' Id. at 1456; see also infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing when a
quote is so fabricated as to support inference of actual malice).
24 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456.
25 Id.
21 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-57 (1985). Actual malice must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Anderson Court held that a "ruling on
a motion for summary judgment must [also] be guided by the New York Times 'clear and
convincing' evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice
exists." Id. at 257.
27 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1455-56.
28 Id. at 1456-63.
2 Id. at 1478 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Regarding what he categorized as Malcolm's
extreme departure from the standards of ethical journalism, Judge Kozinski noted that "au-
thorities are adamant and uniform in condemning the use of altered quotes that are not
faithful to the meaning intended by the speaker." Id. at 1475 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see
also Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976) ("In the catalogue of
responsibilities of journalists, right next to plagiarism ... must be a canon that a journalist
does not invent quotations and attribute them to actual persons").
It has been urged, regarding such journalistic malpractice, that "a complete departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to may ..- be some
evidence of actual malice." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 196-97 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
20 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1478.
21 Id. at 1478-79. Judge Kozinski outlined the following test:
(1) Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of what the
speaker said? (2) If so, is it inaccurate? (3) If so, is the inaccuracy material? (4) If
19891
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fact infer actual malice from Malcolm's actions.2
The Masson court, it is suggested, interpreted the actual mal-
ice standard in a manner which expanded the limited immunity of
the press beyond its intended scope, and thereby extended consti-
tutional protection to deliberate distortions and fabrications. The
first amendment is intended to promote the free and robust debate
of any and all public issues, not the diffusion of fabrications and
distortions.33
This Comment will first examine the development of the ac-
tual malice standard and its basis in the first amendment. It will
then analyze the cases relied upon by the Masson court and assert
that they were misinterpreted by the court, resulting in a rule
which fails to adequately balance the rights of the individual with
the rights of the press. Finally, this Comment will suggest an alter-
native analysis which preserves the ideals and freedoms protected
by the first amendment while still affording due protection to
those individual rights which the actual malice standard was
designed to protect.
I. THE FIRST FREEDOM
The rationale underlying the free press clause of the first
amendment can be stated quite succinctly: "[w]ithout a free press,
there can be no free society."" Freedom of thought and the unfet-
tered discussion of any and all issues of public concern are essen-
tial to the survival and growth of a republican government.35 Nega-
so, is the inaccuracy defamatory? (5) If so, is the inaccuracy a result of [actual]
malice ... ? If the answer to any of these questions is no as a matter of law, the
inquiry stops and the defendant wins. If they could all be answered yes, I would-
send the matter to the jury.
Id.
32 See id. at 1479-86.
3 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The New York Times
Court decided that a case with first amendment implications should be considered "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id;
see also infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing underlying rationale of free-
dom of the press).
" Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. The Court in New York Times quoted Justice
Brandeis' "classic formulation" of this principle:
Those who won our independence believed... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American govern-
ment .... [T]hey knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of pun-
[Vol. 64:1:150
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tive, even caustic opinions, no matter how unpopular, are
necessary to encourage open public debate.36 From this realization
a toleration for error grew.37 Thus, to avoid self-censorship and its
resultant atrophying of public discussion, 8 the Supreme Court de-
termined that truth could not be the standard by which to mea-
sure the constitutional protection of a person's words. 9
ishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to dis-
cuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting rem-
edy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
Similarly, the Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), stated that
"[t]he guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent 'the censor-
ship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential.'"
Id. at 150 (quoting T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 886 (8th ed. 1927)); see also A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) ("It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage"); Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691,
739 (1986) ("The ultimate metaphor of our national political life is that of public debate
leading to the informed and personal consent of the governed").
36 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270; see also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 26
("What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall
be said"); S. WORTON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS iv (1975) ("Freedom of expression
does not ensure anyone automatic acceptance of his idea; all it guarantees is the opportunity
to present them to others").
37 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72. The Court declared "[t]hat erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'" Id. (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
'" See id.; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Curtis Publishing
Co., 388 U.S. at 152; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
"1 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271. The Supreme Court has refused to establish
any test of truth in the context of a libel suit. See id. The Court has noted that
"[a]uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently re-
fused to recognize an exception for any test of truth... especially one that puts the burden
of proving truth on the speaker." Id. Justice Brennan continued, "[tihe constitutional pro-
tection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). Moreover, in
Curtis Publishing, the Court declared that "[w]hile the truth of the underlying facts might
be said to mark the line between publications which are of significant social value and those
which might be suppressed without serious social harm ... we have rejected ... the argu-
ment that a finding of falsity alone should strip protections from the publisher." 388 U.S. at
152.
After a decade of injecting first amendment values into defamation law, the Court reit-
erated and clarified its position. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. In Gertz the Court stated that
"[a]llowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements
does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties." Id.
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The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the concept that
the press enjoys an absolute immunity from liability for defama-
tion.4" In order to balance the need for fair comment 41 and public
dissemination of ideas against a person's right to protection of his
"good name" and reputation,42 the Court established the actual
malice standard.43 The Court's employment of this standard has
served to put the press on notice: where a public figure is con-
cerned, the press will be protected from all error in judgment, as
well as from innocent or negligent mistakes of fact,44 but there is
no constitutionally protected value in the reckless or intentional
misstatement of fact.45
4" See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269; see also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324,
335 (2d Cir. 1969) ("False statements are protected only if they are honestly made").
"' See Robertson, supra note 3, at 201. At common law, a publisher was strictly liable
for defamatory statements, subject only to the defenses of truth or privilege. Id. "Of the
plethora of privileges recognized at common law, the most important from a constitutional
standpoint was the privilege of 'fair comment' on matters of public concern." Id. One of the
conditions for this privilege was the truth of the facts underlying the statement. See Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1228
(1976). However, "[i]n light of the [New York Times] line of cases, it should be obvious that
the privilege of fair comment can no longer be deemed lost by reason of the falsity of the
underlying facts except upon a finding of the requisite degree of fault in relation to falsity."
!d.
42 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42; see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (there should be some duty of reasonable care in the exer-
cise of freedoms guaranteed by first amendment) (overruled by Gertz); Robertson, supra
note 3, at 208 (Gertz majority closely followed Justice Harlan's Rosenbloom dissent).
The Court in Gertz carefully balanced reputational interests with the first amendment
right to free speech. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42. According to the Court, "[tihe need to avoid
self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue." Id. at
341.
[T]he individual's right to the protection of his own good name "reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty .. . [and which] is
entitled to ... recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.
Id. at 341 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)).
"' See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
" See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-43. As the Gertz Court explained, all opinions are pro-
tected "[u]nder the First Amendment [because] there is no such thing as a false idea." Id. at
339.
Although the Court recognized that some innocent and negligent mistakes of fact may
not deserve constitutional protection, "'[s]ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the
proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.'"
Id. at 340 (quoting James Madison from the REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798).
Therefore, "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to
protect speech that matters." Id. at 341.
"' Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340,
342; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
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The right of the press to be free from governmental authority
should be considered in light of a higher purpose: enabling the
press to function as a body free from stricture and restraint in or-
der to ensure that the people have the information vital and neces-
sary to the proper functioning and control of their government.
The Masson court, however, unreasonably broadened the scope of
press immunity; "freedom of the press" does not suggest invalida-
tion of all checks on press activity, nor does it connote abdication
of responsibility.46
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
In Masson, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on four cases to
establish a rule permitting an author to fabricate quotes.4" It is
submitted that these cases do not support such a proposition.
The Masson court cited Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspa-
pers, Inc.4 8 to support its holding that actual malice should not be
inferred where "fabricated quotations are ... 'rational interpreta-
tions' of ambiguous remarks made by the public figure."49 The
Dunn court was faced with the task of applying the actual malice
standard to a Spanish language newspaper's translation, from Eng-
lish to Spanish, of a word with no exact Spanish equivalent.50 The
46 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text; see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at
269 ("libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations"); Eaton, supra
note 2, at 1369 (Supreme Court rejected absolute immunity for press and left some speech
unprotected by the Constitution).
41 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454-55. The four cases are Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1987); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d
910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d
206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976); and Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29,
37-38, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
48 833 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1987).
Is Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452).
10 See Dunn, 833 F.2d at 447-48. In Dunn, the Mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey sued a
Spanish language newspaper challenging its use, in a headline, of the word "cerdos" in
translating remarks he had made characterizing the Hispanic population of Elizabeth as
litterbugs. See id. at 448. Translated literally "cerdos" means "pigs," though it can also be
understood as a reference to a "dirty person, or slovenly person." Id. at 451 n.2. The court
concluded that it was "required to determine whether the actual Spanish word or its Eng-
lish translation should be considered in deciding whether actual malice was implicated in
the publication." Id. at 447-48. The court unequivocally stated that it was unwilling to make
a determination of actual malice based "solely on the translation to English from Spanish
[by the plaintiff] of the language used by the defendant." Id. at 452 (emphasis added). The
court continued, stating that "[i]f the language is Spanish, we must apply the [actual mal-
ice] standard to Spanish . . . because . . . a translation may not reflect the nuances and
subtleties of the original language." Id. This was especially true in Dunn since "there is no
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issue arose out of an attempt to "express the gist of [the plaintiff's]
remarks" for the purpose of creating a headline.51 Thus, Dunn in-
volved the "unique" problems of translation and summarization,
neither of which was implicated in Masson.52
In addition, although the Masson court read Dunn as involv-
ing a fabricated quote,53 the Dunn court provided no indication
that it was dealing with a direct quote. 4 While the plaintiff in
Dunn claimed that the newspaper was quoting him directly,55 the
defendants claimed that no such direct quote was intended.56 After
discussing the defendant's evidence to the contrary, the court
made no finding either way.5 7 For these reasons, it is apparent that
the holding in Dunn fails to support the Masson ruling.
The Masson court also relied upon Hotchner v. Castillo-
Puche5s to hold that an author may fictionalize quotations to the
exact Spanish word for litterer or litterbug." Id. After applying the actual malice standard
to the Spanish words used by the defendants, the court held that "cerdos" was a "fair,
albeit inadequate translation." Id.
" See id. at 451.
62 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1471 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski concluded
that "[t]ranslation necessarily involves a judgment .... But no judgment is required in
quoting an English-speaking person in English." Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). It is sug-
gested that since the mayor's remarks were subject to a number of rational interpretations,
and since an exact translation was impossible, an element of subjectivity was introduced
into the editorial process, one which the court was unwilling to second guess.
6" See id. at 1454. The Masson court quoted the plaintiff's claim in Dunn that "'by
enclosing 'cerdos' ['pigs'] in single quotation marks, [the defendant newspaper] purported to
proclaim that the mayor had in fact used the word 'pigs' in discussing the litter prob-
lem."Id. The court then went on to summarize it's understanding of the holding in Dunn,
stating that actual malice can not be inferred merely because the "quoted language" did not
contain the speakers exact words. Id. at 1456. The court concluded that "[t]he newspaper
editors in Dunn were not attempting to translate a particular word for which there was no
exact equivalent in Spanish; instead they sought to 'express the gist of the mayor's remarks'
by means of a fabricated quotation." Id. at 1456 n.2 (quoting Dunn, 833 F.2d at 451).
64 See Dunn, 833 F.2d at 450-52.
66 Id. at 450.
60 See id. at 451. The Dunn court noted that the "use of [single] quotation marks in
Spanish does not necessarily signify that a literal quotation is intended." Id. The court
made reference to the testimony of the newspaper's editor, who stated that the challenged
headline "'was not intended to convey, nor do I believe our Spanish-speaking readership
interpreted it to convey that Dunn was being directly quoted.'" Id.
57 See id. at 450-52.
6- 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). Hotchner involved a
book about Ernest Hemingway in which Hemingway was quoted as referring to A. E. Hotch-
ner as a "dirty and a terrible ass-licker. There's something phony about him. I wouldn't
sleep in the same room with him." Id. at 914. Hemingway's statement was originally pub-
lished in Spanish. Id at 911. However, in translating from Spanish to English, Doubleday's
editors softened the statement to "I don't trust him." Id. Hotchner contended that the de-
fendant should be held liable because it knew for a fact Hemingway never made that state-
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extent that they "do not 'alter the substantive content' of unam-
biguous remarks actually made by the public figure." 59 In Hotch-
ner, the quote in issue had been altered in an effort to decrease its
potential for defamatory impact.60 While the court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim because "the change did not increase the defama-
tory impact or alter the substantive content of [the] statement
about Hotchner,"61 the underlying rationale was that a publisher
should not be held liable for toning down an offensive statement
where it could not have been held liable for publishing the "uncut
version. '6 2 Thus the court in Hotchner was not granting a license
to fictionalize "to some extent," but rather was excusing such "fic-
tionalizing" so as to avoid holding the defendants liable for making
the passage less offensive than it was originally. This rationale is
inapplicable to Masson, wherein Malcolm's interpretations con-
sistently suggested more pejorative versions of Masson's actual
statements. 4
Having established this limited right to fabricate quotes, the
Masson court next cited two other cases to set the bounds of this
right.65 The Masson court interpreted Bindrim v. Mitchell 6 as
standing for the proposition that "an author's privilege to alter
quotations is not unlimited. 67 However, the Bindrim court never
mentioned, discussed, or alluded to any such "privilege. 68
In addition, the Masson court relied upon Carson v. Allied
ment. Id. The court did not agree and found no evidence of actual malice. Id.
Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914).




61 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456-63, 1467-70; see also supra note 16 (examples of Mal-
colm's inflammatory alterations).
0' See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976); Bindrim v. Mitch-
ell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 37-38, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
66 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
7 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456.
68 See Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 76-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-39. In Bindrim, the
California District Court of Appeal found that actual malice could be inferred from the
attribution of statements and actions to an ostensibly fictional character in a novel when,
based upon the story line, that character could readily be recognized as the plaintiff. Id. The
court began by directing its inquiry into whether or not such statements and actions could
be considered statements of fact reflecting the actual words and deeds of the plaintiff. Id.
The court then explored the standards for differentiating between fact and opinion, and,
having determined that the statements in the novel were statements of fact, treated the
fabricated quotations in the novel as it would any other misstatement of fact. Id. at 76-79,
155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-40.
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News Co.6" to help set the parameters of permissible press activ-
ity.70 The Masson court concluded that a "factfinder may infer ac-
tual malice from a fabricated quotation when the language attrib-
uted to the plaintiff is wholly the product of the author's
imagination."'71 However, the Carson court referred to "any 'prod-
uct of [one's] imagination'" as "another example of reckless disre-
gard for the truth." 2 The Ninth Circuit interpreted this to mean
that only a fabrication which is "wholly imagined" could support
an inference of actual malice.73 The Masson court distinguished
between situations where the author simply made up quotations
without interviewing the subject-as was the case in Carson-and
where the author fabricated quotes only after speaking with the
subject-as in Masson.74 However, the mere fact that an author
has a base of knowledge from which to work does not change the
reality that statements were falsely and publicly attributed to an
individual who never actually made them. It is apparent from Car-
son that actual malice can be inferred from the fabrication of
quotations.7a
It is submitted that by expansively interpreting these cases
without due regard for their specific factual underpinnings, the
" 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976). Carson concerned the publication of an article in
The National Insider claiming that NBC moved The Tonight Show to California so that
Johnny Carson could be closer to the woman who caused the breakup of his first marriage.
Id. at 208. The article's discussion of Carson's desire to move "contain[ed] supposed quota-
tions by Carson to the executives and their responses and reactions [to him]." Id. at 212. In
justifying the fabrications, the author concluded that such a conversation "seemed to be
simply a logical extension of what must have gone on." Id.
11 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454-56.
71 Id. at 1455-56 (citing Carson, 529 F.2d at 213).
72 See Carson, 529 F.2d at 213 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732
(1968)) (emphasis added).
11 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1455-56.
71 See id. at 1454-56.
11 See Carson, 529 F.2d at 213. Carson relied in part upon Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414
F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970), a case not cited by the Masson
court, in which the Second Circuit expressly disapproved of "melding," "distillation," "mis-
placed emphasis," "exaggeration" and "distortion" in relaying another's words through the
press. Carson, 529 F.2d at 337.
In Goldwater, the defendant published an unscientific survey of psychiatrists concern-
ing the mental state of then presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. Id. at 328-30. In pub-
lishing the survey, the defendant altered the responses in various ways. Id. at 337. The court
noted that the words quoted from one survey response "were changed and rewritten." Id.
The court stated that "[o]ne cannot fairly argue his good faith or avoid liability by claiming
that he is relying on the reports of another if the latter's statements or observations are
altered or taken out of context." Id.
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Ninth Circuit formulated a rule which fails to adequately balance
the rights of the press and the rights of the individual, as required
by the actual malice standard. By injecting the highly speculative
and subjective element of "rational interpretation" into the actual
malice equation, it is asserted the Masson court has developed a
rule which will functionally immunize the press from liability for
all but the most obviously ill-willed misquotes.
A Fact Is A Fact
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally stated
that there is no constitutional value in a false statement of fact
recklessly or intentionally made.76 It is suggested that any deliber-
ately fabricated defamatory statement purporting to be a direct
quotation should, as a matter of law, be considered a false state-
ment of fact sufficient to support an inference of actual malice.
Therefore, although the issue in Masson was a novel one,77 the
Ninth Circuit took an approach contrary to the law of defamation
as developed by the Supreme Court over the past three decades. 78
Quotation marks serve a highly specific function in the written
English language. 79 They indicate that what one has written is in
fact the words of another, taken "verbatim."80 Yet, the Ninth Cir-
cuit simply focused on whether the words chosen relayed the mere
denotative equivalent of the words actually spoken."' In countering
this argument and concluding that a quote should be considered a
statement of fact, Judge Kozinski stressed the reader's perspective,
that is, how a reader might be misled if a quote is not relayed ex-
actly as spoken.2 However, the rationale for considering a quote a
76 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
77 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1454.
78 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. "If a writer can sit down in the quiet
of his cubicle and create conversations as 'a logical extension of what must have gone on'
and dispense this as news, it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment protection such
fiction can claim." Carson, 529 F.2d at 213.
79 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1465 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1868 (1963); see SHAW & SHAFFER,
McGRAW HILL HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH 179-82 (1952).
81 See supra notes 12, 21-28 and accompanying text (summarizing Masson court
analysis).
82 See Masson, 881 F.2d at 1465-66 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski's dissent
argued as follows:
[Q]uotations allow readers to draw their own conclusions about the speaker's char-
acter, motive, candor and lucidity .... By putting the phrase into Masson's own
mouth and concealing her role as interpreter and editor, Malcolm has caused Mas-
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statement of fact goes even further. It is suggested that the actual
purpose behind the words-why the speaker chose them and what
the speaker wanted to say-must be the paramount consideration.
Although the Masson holding protects the cognitive function of a
quotation, its emotive, relational function must be protected as
well.8 3 In allowing others to substitute their words for the
speaker's, it is submitted that the Masson court has also allowed
them to substitute their perceptions of what the speaker was feel-
ing and thinking at the moment the words were uttered. Thus, the
ultimate fallacy in the Masson decision lies in its consideration of
a direct quote not as a statement of fact, but merely as a statement
analogous to an opinion, open to interpretation and translation by
the press.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that a direct quote should be
considered a statement of fact and, therefore, any intentional or
reckless alteration which makes the statement defamatory is per se
unprotected by the free press clause of the first amendment. To
the contrary, the Ninth Circuit overlooked the parameters of the
first amendment established by the Supreme Court for the protec-
tion of the press and the people, thus providing unwarranted pro-
son a serious injury and made it look like a self-inflicted wound. It is this conceal-
ment-the use of quotation marks to deceive the reader about the author's edito-
rial role-that libel law prohibits and the Constitution does not, in my opinion,
protect.
Id. at 1466 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
"3 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). Justice Harlan, in defending a per-
son's right to choose his own words, stated that:
[L]inguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emo-
tive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive intent of individual speech, has little or no regard
for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more im-
portant element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id.
"Ignoring the inherent subjectivity and imprecision of language may lead to a constitu-
tionally impermissible evaluation of the truth of normative or judgmental statements in the
guise of examining factual truth." Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment:
An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263, 281 (1978); see Baker v. Los
Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 261, 721 P.2d 87, 91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210
(1986) (reader may understand quote not to be statement of fact when viewed in context),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
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tection of distortions and fabrications. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit
should have looked beyond the impact of the Masson rule on the
immediate litigants, and explored its ramifications on the basic po-
litical processes of this country. In an age dominated by the mass
media, the press should not be free to present to the people
whatever "truth" it sees fit.
John J. McGreevy
